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THE LAW AND ECONOMICS VIRUS
Spencer Weber Waller*

For theories and schools, like microbes and corpuscles,
devour one another and by their strife ensure the continuity of life.
-Marcel Proustl

INTRODUCTION

The Law and Economics movement is a leading example of a
highly successful legal ideology. 2 Law and Economics applies
economic reasoning to legal questions and in general views the creation
and enforcement of legal rules primarily in terms of how legal rules and
institutions promote allocative efficiency and wealth maximization. In
its strongest form, the Chicago School version of Law and Economics
3
argues that Justice is Efficiency.
This mixture of positive and normative analysis of the law has
spread in numerous ways since its introduction in the University of
Chicago Law School in the late 1940s. It has spread within the legal
* Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. Thanks to John Breen, John Bronsteen, Al Brophy, Peter Carstensen,
Brett Frischmann, Diane Geraghty, David Herring, Ted Janger, Christopher Leslie, Rob Mikos,
John New, John Nowak, Michael Pardo, Anthony Sebok, Greg Shaffer, Larry Solan, Stephen
Siegel, Anita Weinberg, and the participants at faculty workshops at Haifa Law School,
Louisville, Loyola University Chicago, Notre Dame, and Pittsburgh for their helpful suggestions
and comments. Additional thanks to Rob Hernquist and Jillian Brady for their research
assistance. The preparation of this essay was supported by a summer research stipend from
Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1 4 IN SEARCH OF LOST TIME: SODOM AND GOMORRAH 291 (C.K. Scott Moncrieff &
Terence Kilmartin trans., D.J. Enright ed., Modem Library 2003) (1922).
2 1 use legal ideology throughout this essay as "the framework of ideas and beliefs that give
meaning to legal concepts and shape legal thought and discourse .... " Robert G. Bone, Personal
and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70
B.U. L. REV. 213, 217 (1990); see also MICHAEL E. TIGAR & MADELEINE R. LEVY, LAW AND

284 (1977) ("A legal ideology is a statement, in terms of a system of
rules of law, of the aspirations, goals, and values of a social group."); cf DANIEL BELL, THE END
OF IDEOLOGY (rev. ed. 1962) (defining ideology generally as an action oriented system of
beliefs).
3 See generally Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980).
THE RISE OF CAPITALISM
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academy so pervasively that law and economics courses are taught at
most schools, and it is the dominant form of discourse in many fields.
Law and Economics also has spread from its origins in antitrust
law to a wide variety of legal fields, so that virtually any area of U.S.
law can be analyzed from a law and economics perspective. Finally, it
has spread from the United States to other legal jurisdictions, so that an
increasing number of countries are creating, analyzing, and enforcing
law with an eye toward its economic consequences, usually defined in
4
terms of allocative efficiency and wealth maximization.
Despite, or perhaps because of, its many successes, Law and
Economics has engendered internal and external critiques. Numerous
economic and non-economic critiques have been leveled, most
centering around the Law and Economics notions of utility and wealth
maximization, its methodologies, and the ability and desirability of
treating all legal rights and remedies as commodities to be traded in
5
markets.
The Law and Economics movement has survived most of these
critiques quite nicely to become one of the dominant legal ideologies of
6
the late twentieth century and the beginning of the new millennium.
Nevertheless, the influence of Law and Economics, particularly in legal
academia, is uneven. It is the dominant, if not nearly exclusive mode of
discourse at certain law schools and within certain disciplines, and yet is
largely absent at other schools and within other fields of the law. Much
ink has been spilled in chronicling the strengths and weaknesses of Law
and Economics approaches to particular legal problems and disciplines
and the substance of what rules should look like under an economic
approach to the law. However, there has been far less analysis of why
certain fields of law and legal jurisdiction have been prone to adopt a
Law and Economics approach to the law and why others have been
resistant to its appeals.
A proponent of law and economics methodology will be inclined
to argue that this approach has taken hold, and should be adopted even

4 See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN

STATES (2002) (analyzing the influence of the Chicago School of Economics on the
transformation of the economies and legal regimes of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and particularly
Chile).
5 The literature of such critiques is vast. One amusing, but particularly caustic, example is
Don Herzog, Externalitiesand Other Parasites,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895 (2000).
6 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 301-05 (1995); BAILEY
KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND
JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 28-29 (1994); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:

LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 83-105 (1995); Eli M. Salzberger, The Economic
Analysis of Law--The Dominant Methodologyfor Legal Research?! (Univ. of Haifa Faculty of
Law
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
1044382,
2007),
available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1044382.
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more widely, because it is correct and produces good results in the real
world. Opponents of this methodology have argued that Law and
Economics has taken hold because it is aligned with powerful interests
that benefit from the adoption of more market-oriented and laissez-faire
legal rules.
This essay is the first one to go beyond this type of debate and
analyze in a different light the successes and failures of the Law and
Economics movement to influence the discourse in other fields and
jurisdictions of law. It emphasizes the institutional characteristics of
some of the fields of law where the Law and Economics movement, and
in particular the Chicago School form of the movement, 7 has had the
most influence, and those where it has encountered the most resistance.
I argue that the institutional characteristics of the field of law are a more
significant determinant of whether the Chicago School takes hold or is
rejected than the correctness or the error of the substance of the analysis
that it offers or the interests that it serves or opposes. In so doing, I
hope to shed light on where and why the Chicago School has been
rejected even where it may well be correct or even where it serves
powerful interests that would profit from its adoption.
I use the metaphor of the virus to capture the dynamics of how the
Chicago School has spread by penetrating a new area of the law,
replicating itself, and transmitting itself to new host bodies of law or
legal jurisdictions. The viral metaphor is particularly apt, not just to the
spread of the Chicago School but to the spread or rejection of all legal
ideologies. It both describes and predicts how an intellectual approach
gains entrance into a host body of law, uses the host to reproduce and
spread within that body of law, and later expresses the now multiplied
virus to other nearby hosts.
Despite the potential pejorative connotation of viral metaphors,
they are not intended as such. There are certainly other metaphors
drawn from biology and elsewhere that can be deployed, but they
neither capture the active attack and resistance that best characterizes
the relationship between the spread of ideology and the fields of law
under examination, nor the positive and negative virulence that often
accompanies the Chicago School as it makes its claim on the discourse
in a particular body of law. Viral metaphors are most helpful because
they shed light to both explain and predict why some fields and bodies
of law eagerly embrace this way of thinking about the law while others
couldn't care less.
This essay proceeds as follows: Part I explains the virus as
metaphor and how it helps analyze the process by which legal ideology
7 See generally JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE CHICAGO SCHOOL: HOW THE UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO ASSEMBLED THE THINKERS WHO REVOLUTIONIZED ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 11

(2007).
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spreads from host to host within the legal system. Part II uses the viral
metaphor to develop a theory of the spread of legal ideology. It sets
forth two tentative hypotheses to explain the relative successes of the
Chicago School in some fields and its relative failures to dominate the
discourse in other fields. The first hypothesis is that a more centralized
host body of law is more likely to be infected by a new ideological
virus. The second hypothesis is that the presence of a strong competing
first principle in the host body of law will act as an effective antibody
immunizing the host from the successful introduction of a new
ideology, be it the Chicago School or another way of thinking and
speaking about law. In particular, a body of law with a strong existing
first principle of a non-consequentialist nature will be much more
resistant to new ideological viruses.
Part III tests these hypotheses by examining examples of different
bodies of legal discourse where the Chicago School of Law and
Economics originated or was introduced. Examples drawn from U.S.
antitrust law, consumer protection, child and family law, and European
Union (E.U.) competition law illustrate where the Chicago School has
succeeded or failed in changing the legal discourse or where it is simply
too soon to tell. I conclude with brief reflections on how the viral
metaphor can be applied to analyzing the spread and rejection of other
schools of thoughts and bodies of law as well as some ironies that the
viral metaphor suggests about the future influence of the Law and
Economics movement in competition with new ideological viruses that
will inevitably arise.
I.

LEGAL IDEOLOGY AS METAPHORIC VIRUS

While no one has applied the virus metaphor to analyze the spread
and rejection of law and economics methodology, others have applied
viral metaphors and related evolutionary and epidemiological concepts
to a host of legal issues. Viral metaphors have been used by Duncan
Kennedy in connection with the development of the Critical Legal
Studies movement. 8 Guido Calabresi, while still Dean at Yale Law
School, relied on a similar metaphor in responding to correspondence as
to why Yale, as the home of legal realist movement, didn't have any
"crits" on its faculty by quipping: "[T]hose with Cow Pox don't get
Small Pox." 9 Jim Chen, writing under the pseudonym Gil Grantmore,
8 DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE 73 (1997); see also

Critical Legal Studies (Ddbut de Sicle): A Symposium on Duncan Kennedy's A Critique of
Adjudication, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 701 (2001).
9 Richard Michael Fischl, The Epidemiology of Critique, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 478

(2003).
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relied on the metaphor of the bacteriophage to analyze developments in
the interpretation of the Second Amendment to the Constitution in light
of the events of September 1 lth.' 0 More recently, former Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Chairman William Kovacic has invoked genetic and
evolutionary metaphors to analyze the state of current U.S. antitrust law
in terms of its intellectual DNA. 1
A.

The Importance of Metaphor

Metaphors exist at virtually every level of legal discourse. Notable
sources include: sports ("three strikes and you're out"), the
anthropomorphizing of inanimate objects or legal constructs (a
corporation is a person), the body, nature, the animal kingdom, disease,
health, direction, size, spatial orientation, and a host of others. These
metaphors both reveal and conceal ideological choices.
In the legal context, metaphors perform an important conceptual
function in framing a lawyer's, scholar's, or judge's understanding of
complex phenomena. 12 The default metaphors that we tend to accept
uncritically are often crucial to understanding a case or doctrine and
define the boundary lines between the legal categories that determine
relevant rules. 13 Or as Justice Cardozo observed, "[m]etaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
14
they end often by enslaving it.'
10 Gil Grantmore, The Phages ofAmerican Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 455, 492-94 (2002).
A bacteriophage, or phage, is a virus hosted by a bacterium, rather than an animal.
II William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Lawfor Dominant
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/HarvardDouble Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1.
12 GARY M1NDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE

LEGAL MIND 81 (1999).
13 Id. at 81-83.
14 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (1926). There is, however, a debate in legal
scholarship as to how exactly metaphors work. An important group of legal scholars have relied
upon the cognitive psychology work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson to argue that metaphors
are deeply rooted in the cognitive functioning of the human mind and that legal reasoning, like
any other form of human reasoning, would be impossible without routine resort to metaphor.
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); see also ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2002); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING

N THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001); Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a
Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the
Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004); Carl S. Bjerre, Mental Capacity as
Metaphor, 18 INT'L J. SEMIOTICS L. 101 (2005); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and
ConstitutionalMyth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181 (2004); Steven L. Winter, The Power Thing, 82
VA. L. REV. 721 (1996). A slightly different view of the importance of metaphor in cognitive
science is set forth in the work of Steven Pinker and summarized in his latest book, which
contends that metaphor is our crucial talent as human thinkers. STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF
THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE (2007).
Other scholars and philosophers do not view metaphors in cognitive terms, but still
recognize that they are powerful organizational devices that can give rise to surprising new
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Outside of law, the viral metaphor is increasingly common as well.
References to computer viruses are well-known in ordinary parlance.
The growth of so-called viral marketing is quickly becoming equally
well known. 15 The everyday ordinary use of viral terminology outside
of medical discourse suggests that the virus may in fact transcend
metaphor altogether and simply constitute a non-metaphoric figure of
speech that helps ordinary non-medical persons understand a wide
16
variety of phenomena being studied.
B.

The Viral Metaphor

Understanding the nature of a virus is central to its metaphoric
value. Viruses are the most abundant biological entities on the planet
and second in terms of biomass. 17 They are also among the most
mysterious. Even the basic question of whether viruses are alive in the
normal sense of the term is hotly debated, since they cannot reproduce
on their own. 18

meanings. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 16-20 (1989).

Even those

scholars not inclined to give metaphor a central role in legal thought nonetheless concede that it is
an effective rhetorical device to jolt one out of an unquestioning frame of reference. RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 523-24 (1995). Closely related to metaphor is the notion ofmemes,
which are hypothetical units of cultural transmissions. Thomas Cotter, Memes and Copyrights,
80 TUL. L. REV. 331 (2005). See generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY 42-73 (1998); SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (2000); RICHARD BRODIE,

VIRUS OF THE MIND: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MEME (1995); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE
SELFISH GENE 189-201 (3d ed. 2006); STEPHEN SHENNAN, GENES, MEMES AND HUMAN
HISTORY: DARWINIAN ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION (2003).
15 See MICHAEL BRYCE, VIRAL MARKETING: POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS (2007); CONNECTED

MARKETING: THE VIRAL, BUZZ AND WORD OF MOUTH REVOLUTION (Justin Kirby & Paul
Marsden eds., 2006); RUSSELL GOLDSMITH, VIRAL MARKETING: GET YOUR AUDIENCE TO DO

YOUR MARKETING FOR YOU (2002); RICHARD PERRY & ANDREW WHITAKER, VIRAL
MARKETING IN A WEEK (2002); DAVID MEERMAN SCOTT, THE NEW RULES OF MARKETING AND
PR: HOW TO USE NEWS RELEASES, BLOGS, PODCASTING, VIRAL MARKETING AND ONLINE
MEDIA TO REACH BUYERS DIRECTLY (2007).
16 SAM GLUCKSBERG, UNDERSTANDING FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE: FROM METAPHORS TO
IDIOMS (2001); cf Alex Kotlowitz, Blocking the Transmission of Violence, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 52; Spike.com, Popular Viral Videos, http://www.ifilm.com/
channel/viralvideo (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
17 Trevor Douglas & Mark Young, Viruses: Making Friendswith Old Foes, 312 SCIENCE 873
(2006).
18 Luis P. Villarreal, Are Viruses Alive?, SCI. AM., Dec. 2004, at 100; see, e.g., EDWARD K.
WAGNER & MARTINEZ J. HEWLETT, BASIC VIROLOGY 9 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that viruses
are only "live" when in the active process of infecting a cell and replicating in that cell); Scott
LaFee, Pandemic'sBox: How Do You Contain an Evolving Avian Flu and the Threat to People?,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 25, 2006, at F1 ("No organism is hardier than a virus, in part
because it's not really alive. Unlike bacteria and other cell-based life forms, viruses consist only
of incomplete bundles of RNA or DNA. To replicate, they require the reproductive machinery of
a host cell."); Michael D. Lemonick, The Killers All Around, TIME, Sept. 12, 1994, at 62
("[V]iruses are only half alive at best."); All the Virology on the WWW-Frequently Asked
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While it is debatable what viruses are in a conceptual sense, there
is widespread agreement as to their composition and behavior. One of
the leading medical texts states: "In essence, viruses are collections of
genetic information directed toward one end: their own replication.
They are the ultimate and prototypical example of 'selfish genes." '" 9 In
more lay terms:
They consist of little more than a shell of protein and a bit of genetic
material... which contains instructions for making more virusesbut no machinery to do the job. In order to reproduce, a virus has to
invade a cell, co-opting the cell's own DNA to create a virus
20
factory.
A virus also needs a method to transfer itself from one host to
another.2' The nature of the method of transmission determines how
infectious the virus will be. 22 The effect of a virus also depends to a
great extent on the nature of the population to which it spreads. A
person, who has developed sufficiently powerful immune responses to
prevent or destroy infection before it affects him, may not fall ill no
matter how he first became exposed to the source of infection. Even the
most easily spread or the most potent virus will have little consequences
if the infection kills the patient before he has any contact with other
members of the community or if the virus does not survive the demise
of its host. Similarly, if the population is highly dispersed, then even a
significant viral infection will have little chance to spread absent the
most powerful method of transmission. In contrast, a densely packed
population with frequent contact between persons may be a fertile
breeding ground for infection and transmission, even if the virus is not
particularly virulent nor the method of transmission particularly
effective.
Questions, http://www.virology.net/garTyfavwebfaq.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) (describing
generally accepted views of viruses over time). But see Monika Haring et al., Independent Virus
Development Outside a Host, 436 NATURE 1101 (2005) (describing an exceptional property of a
newly discovered virus to develop outside of a host under certain conditions).
19 WAGNER & HEWLETr, supra note 18, at 3.
20 Lemonick, supra note 18; see also Douglas & Young, supra note 17 ("The essential nature
of all viruses is to infect a host cell, replicate, package its nucleic acid, and exit the cell."). As
one standard virology text states: "By the most basic definition, viruses are composed of a
genome and one or more proteins coating that genome. The genetic information for such a
protein coat and other information required for the replication of the genome are encoded in that
genome." WAGNER & HEWLETT, supra note 18, at 10; see also Villareal, supra note 18.
21 WAGNER & HEWLETT, supra note 18, at 15.
22 For example, the HIV virus, although devastating to its victims, is in fact relatively hard to
transmit. Its principal vectors are through the direct transmission of the virus between the blood
or other bodily fluids of infected persons (for example, through unprotected sexual contact),
blood transfusions, or the sharing of needles between intravenous drug users. Other viruses such
as the common cold and the flu are far more infectious, and can be easily transmitted through
coughing and sneezing, but fortunately are far less serious for most recipients. Still other viruses
can be transmitted only through insect bites or the consumption of infected food. WAGNER &
HEWLETT, supra note 18, at 22-23.
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Viruses can have a constructive, as well as a destructive, impact on
society. 23 Because viruses reproduce so quickly, and without precise
duplication of their genomes, mistakes happen. A gene sequence is
transcribed; a protein is added, dropped, or reassigned. Viruses also can
freely swap genes with each other in a process called "reassortment"
that can generate new strains as well. 24 In other words, random
mutations occur frequently, some positive and some negative. 25
Further, exposure to viruses is the leading source of immunity to future
infection. In addition, viruses can be used as delivery devices for a
number of positive medical applications. 26 Good, bad, or indifferent,
the virus represents a fundamental building block of life and a powerful
metaphor when applied to law.

II.

How LEGAL VIRUSES SPREAD

These principles can be distilled into two working hypotheses to
measure the relative success or failure of the spread of the Chicago
School virus between areas of the law and between legal jurisdictions.
First, the more densely packed the field, the greater the likelihood of
deep impact. The more diffuse a population, the smaller the chance of
dramatic effect. Second, a virus or ideology spread among a population
that has a robust ideological immune system has a lesser chance of
creating a lasting impact than a virus spread among a population with
no preexisting ideological immune system or one that is actually
favorable to the new way of thinking.
A.

The Role of Centralization

One can thus hypothesize that the Chicago School, or any legal
ideology, will be most successful when it seeks to infect an area of law
or legal jurisdiction where law-making is highly centralized and where
the greatest number of significant law-making actors are close by. In
such a case, all else being equal, one host can transmit a new ideology
23 WAGNER & HEWLETT, supra note 18. For obvious reasons, one does not hear a lot about
the helpful or innocuous viruses that inhabit our planet in massive numbers and in proportion to
other biological organisms. Most viruses are, in fact, innocuous, and are a leading source of
genetic innovation. Villareal, supra note 18.
24 LaFee, supra note 18.
25 Id.

26 Douglas & Young, supra note 17; see, e.g., Maggie Fox, Stem Cells Without EmbryosSkin Cells Transformed, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/latestCrisis/idUSN20581750 (last visited Oct. 15, 2009) (describing use of viruses to
induce cells to act like embryonic stem cells).
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to another more quickly and effectively. Additionally, the host will
have a much larger untapped body of subsequent hosts to which it can
further transmit the ideology in the shortest period of time. This is quite
similar to the way public choice theory would predict that law-making
could be most easily captured if it were highly centralized into a single,
all powerful entity that could be the focus of a sustained attack of the
most intensely affected rent seeking body or bodies. 27
Centralization can occur in many different forms as set forth in
Table 1. In general, the body of law most at risk for a viral makeover is
federal: concentrated in a single agency, and preemptive of all state or
private enforcement. Once the virus infects its federal host, the battle
would be over for the foreseeable future. Conversely, one would
assume that a highly diffuse body of law-with its law-making
authority distributed widely among a large number of competing
institutions and players at multiple levels-would be a much more
formidable body to infect, capture, and retain for any given ideology.

27 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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Table 1. Centralizing Forces in American and International Law
Types of Centralizing Forces
Exclusive or Primary Federal
Jurisdiction, or Specialized Court
Agency Driven Law-Making

Restricted Private Rights of Action

Uniform Law-Making Process

Soft Harmonization of Law
Internationally

Conditionality in National Funding or
International Lending Programs

Treaties and International
Conventions

Common Law Processes

Selected Examples
Antitrust; Securities Regulation;
Class Action Fairness Act; Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Federal Communications
Commission, Securities Exchange
Commission, Internal Revenue
Service rulings and letter opinions;
DOJ and FTC antitrust enforcement
and policy guidelines, agency rules,
agency advisory opinions, and
consent decrees
Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act; Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998; Judicially
created immunities and abstention
doctrines; heightened pleadings
standards; state tort reform statutes
American Law Institute; National
Commission on Uniform State Laws;
Model Laws
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development;
International Competition Network;
Basel Accords in Banking;
Memoranda of Understanding
Conditions imposed on federal
funding of state programs;
International Monetary Fund
conditions on loans to developing
countries
World Trade Organization; European
Union; regional trading blocs; United
Nations Conventions; Bilateral
Treaties
Rapid spread of precedent; adoption
by influential jurisdictions; scholarly
consensus
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The presence of a uniform law-making body in an otherwise

diffuse decentralized system or body of law would represent a different
kind of centralizing mechanism. The presence of a specialized court
with exclusive jurisdiction, such as the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in patent matters, would have a similar effect. An important
state such as California or New York adopting a particular ideology in a
particular area of the law also could be the impetus for the spread of that
approach to other states, achieving a degree of uniformity. At the

international level, soft harmonization of law, conditions attached to
loan and aid agreements, and treaties play a similar role. Whatever the

precise method of centralization, this part of the hypothesis accounts for
both the method of transmission and the population density in analyzing
the effect and rate of viral spread and whether there is likely to be a
minor infection or an entire population at risk.
B.

PreexistingIdeology as Antibody

A strong preexisting ideology is analogous to the presence of

strong antibodies in a patient. In terms of legal ideology, persons are
most likely to have a strong negative reaction to the introduction of a

new way of thinking, if they already have a previous strongly formed
28
alternative way of looking at the same issue.
A strong commitment to a preexisting competing ideology or deep

attachment to a differing first principle (particularly if deontological in
nature) will render a body of law or legal jurisdiction more immune to
28 Psychologists refer to this as cognitive dissonance, where a strong precommitment to one
way of thinking renders subjects prone to reject different approaches as untrue, regardless of the
actual merits of the new position. JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A
CLASSIC THEORY (2007); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
Cognitive psychologists also analyze such thought patterns in terms of prototypes and family
resemblances, where subjects cannot make connections between different objects or concepts
unless and until the concepts under study bear enough features in common to be accepted as
belonging together. WINTER, supra note 14, at 25-27; Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions
and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a Linguist in the Court?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069 (1995);
Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 66-68 (1998);
Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 235. In more literary and philosophical terms, participating in one form of
discourse makes us blind to the value of seeing any other way of analyzing an issue as a true or
authentic form of science or analysis. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
AND THE DISCOURSE OF LANGUAGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith & Rupert Swyer trans., 1st American
ed. 1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 82-87, 117, 126-33, 233 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans.,
1980); Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the Language of Business, 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 283 (2001). In the history of science, this is similarly revealed in the nature of
paradigms and the resistance to alternative scientific theories until the old world view is literally
overwhelmed and a new paradigm prevails and becomes entrenched. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
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the introduction of new legal ideology, all other things being equal.
Similarly, a body of law or legal jurisdiction with no coherent existing
ideology, an ideology in transition or in internal conflict, or an existing
similar ideology will be more receptive to the introduction of a new
ideology. In viral terms, the strength, coherence, and degree of
difference of the existing ideology to the invading ideological force,
represents the antibodies and immune system of the existing body of
law and the ability to defeat the new ideological virus seeking to find
willing receptors to draw itself into the new host.
C.

The Twin Hypotheses of Centralizationand PreexistingIdeologies

The interaction of the two hypotheses, in terms of how they affect
the introduction of a new legal ideology into a field or jurisdiction of
law, can be set forth in a simple two-by-two table. This basic dynamic
is set forth in Table 2, which depicts the expected results when a new
ideological virus is introduced into a new host.
Table 2. The Relationship Between Centralization and Preexisting
Ideology
Ideology/Centralization

Weak Preexisting
Counter-Ideology

Strong Preexisting
Counter-Ideology

High Degree of
Centralization

Infection Most
Likely to Succeed

Low Degree of
Centralization

Infection Contested,
Outcome
Indeterminate

Infection Contested,
Outcome
Indeterminate
Infection Least
Likely to Succeed

The twin hypotheses of centralization and competing first
principles suggest that the bodies of law and legal jurisdictions that are
most centralized and the most in disarray ideologically should be the
most prone to infection and the most likely to serve as fertile hosts for
retransmission of the ideological virus to other disciplines and
jurisdictions. Conversely, those fields of law that are most
decentralized and imbued with strong preexisting competing first
principles should prove to be the most inhospitable hosts, generally
rejecting the initial introduction of competing ideologies, isolating and
rejecting the handful of members within the population advocating the
new ideologies, and forcing the new ideology to look elsewhere for its
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propagation and survival. Otherwise, the results are indeterminate and
harder to predict in advance. What follows next is a series of real world
examples that test these hypotheses in the various permutations of
centralization and decentralization and strong versus weak preexisting
ideologies.

III.

THE VIRUS IN ACTION

This Part traces how and when the Chicago School virus has
spread from one body of law to another and from one jurisdiction to
another. Most new viruses begin with a mutation and then begin their
spread. For the Chicago School strain we most care about, that
mutation began in the field of antitrust, a body of law it has come to
dominate. This Part begins with a brief review of the rise of the
Chicago School in antitrust and continues with a look at where it has
most successfully spread and where it has encountered the most
resistance in order to test the working hypothesis of centralization and
competing first principles as the key to understanding the spread of, and
resistance to, legal ideology.
A.

Antitrust as the Beginning

The story of the Chicago School and its influence in the legal
academy, the judiciary, and the antitrust enforcement agencies has been
told many times, but normally in order to either praise or to criticize its
influence and policy prescriptions. Virtually all versions of the story
begin with the influence of Aaron Director at the University of Chicago
Law School. 29 Professor Director was a brilliant academic economist,
teacher, and mentor, but published next to nothing. 30 This writer's block
led to his failure to even complete his Ph.D. dissertation and an eventual
appointment at the University of Chicago law school, after he was

29 VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 7, at 69-70 (2007) (analyzing Director's role as part of the

broader history of the Chicago School of Economics); Henry G. Manne, How Law and
Economics Was Marketed in a Hostile World: A Very PersonalHistory, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 309, 309 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K.

Rowley eds., 2005) [hereinafter Manne, Marketing]; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 925-26 (1979); Henry G. Manne, An Intellectual
History of the George Mason University School of Law, http://www.law.gmu.edu/econ/

history.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Manne, IntellectualHistory].
30 One of the few antitrust pieces by Director was a co-authored essay for which his co-author
and close friend, Edward Levi, almost certainly did most of the actual writing. See Aaron
Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REv. 281

(1956).
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unable to secure an appointment with any economics faculty.
Director had close personal and professional ties with the free
market economist Milton Friedman 3' and viewed antitrust through the
lens of price theory, gradually building a coherent philosophy of
antitrust out of his examination of discrete issues in the field. His
insights included a skepticism of the then prevailing wisdom that most
examples of market power, vertical restraints, and vertical integrations
were anticompetitive in intent or effect. He gradually developed a view
that such practices were almost always an efficient response to the
elimination of free riders and other inefficiencies in the distributional
process; below-cost pricing was rarely if ever anticompetitive; and
unilateral conduct was rarely a matter of serious antitrust concern. In
his view, the focus of antitrust law and enforcement should be cartels
and only those horizontal mergers producing monopoly, or nearly so.
Director's influence as a teacher alone was such that the very
concept of an economic approach to law and the specific neo-classical
price theory approach to antitrust championed by Director soon spread
within the University of Chicago law faculty and then elsewhere in
antitrust and related disciplines through the work of former students,
disciplines, and later adherents such as Ward Bowman, Lester Telser,
Harold Demsetz, Wesley Liebeler, Henry Manne, Richard Posner,
Edward Kitch, and Robert Bork. 32
Henry Manne identifies a key event in the spread of law and
economics (but not necessarily a Chicago School approach) within the
legal academy as the hiring of Guido Calabresi as a professor at the
Yale Law School. 33 Calabresi was a lawyer and Ph.D. economist who
did groundbreaking work applying law and economics principles to the
tort and insurance fields. 34 For Manne, this was key since Calabresi was
the first prominent scholar in the field without either a University of
Chicago affiliation or pedigree. 35
Another key event was Manne's own relentless proselytizing of a
law and economics approach that helped spread the approach and the
ideology to the rest of legal academy through his own scholarship in the
corporate law area and through a series of summer institutes for law

31 Friedman was married to Director's sister. VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 7, at 69.
32 NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER

TO POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006); Manne, Intellectual History, supra note 29;
Colloquy, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance ofLaw and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26
J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983).
33 Manne, IntellectualHistory, supra note 29.
34 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

(1970); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
35 Manne, Marketing, supra note 29, at 312.
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Manne also credits a similar set of programs and

conferences for judges in helping to expose the judiciary to the Chicago
School approach to law and economics as well. 37 The marketing of law
and economics in general, and the Chicago School in particular,
continued through an equally effective series of programs and
fellowships endowed by the Olin Foundation and related organizations
that helped to spread the methodology among junior faculty in law and
38
other disciplines.
Such marketing was viral in nature, certainly in the modem
colloquial sense of the term. Colleagues found these new ideas
exciting. They brought them back to their own institutions and applied
them to their research (or judicial decisions), exposing the ideas to their
colleagues, who in turn adopted them in their own work.
The appearance of then Professor Posner's textbook The Economic
Approach to Law,39 and many similar texts was the next logical step in
the spread of the virus. These texts made it easy for a professor to adopt
this approach as a teaching or research methodology in virtually any
field.
Returning to antitrust, it is important to understand in viral terms
why antitrust was so receptive to the Chicago School in order to also
understand why it fared less well in other areas of the law. Antitrust is a
prime illustration of the hypothesis that the Chicago School, or any
legal ideology, spreads most effectively in those hosts that are more
centralized and lack a strong competing ideological antibody to new
schools of thought.
The federal judiciary and the two federal enforcement agencies are
the key players for antitrust law-making, given the relatively rare
exclusive federal jurisdiction for federal antitrust cases. An early
adopter of Chicago School thinking in Supreme Court antitrust cases
36 Manne, Intellectual History, supra note 29 (estimating that close to 600 law professors had
completed the summer institute by 1993); Manne, Marketing, supra note 29, at 313; see also
Larry E. Ribstein, Henry Manne: Intellectual Entrepreneur(Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. LE08-009, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1094904.
37 Manne, IntellectualHistory, supra note 29 (estimating that over 400 judges had completed
one or more such programs by 1993).
38 John J. Miller, Foundation'sEnd: The Last Days ofJohn M. Olin's Conservative Fortune,
http://www.nationalreview.com/miller/
6,
2005,
Apr.
ONLINE,
REV.
NAT'L
miller200504060758.asp (summarizing law and economics work of the John M. Olin Foundation
and its disbursing final grants before ceasing operations by 2008). For an analysis of the more
general societal influence of the Olin Foundation and similar conservative foundations, see JEAN
STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND
FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996).
39 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, at xix, 23 (6th ed. 2003)

(emphasizing coverage of almost the entire legal system); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (5th ed. 2007) (covering property, contracts, torts, the litigation
process, and criminal law from an economic perspective).
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was Justice Lewis Powell who played an important role in antitrust
jurisprudence in the 1970s and 1980s. 40 The trend toward a Chicago
School approach accelerated during the Reagan Administration, which
adopted a deliberate strategy of appointing a significant number of
judges to the federal appellate courts who had intellectual or literal ties
to the Chicago School and substantial interest and experience in
antitrust. 41 Of equal importance was President Clinton's Supreme Court
appointment of Stephen Breyer, who brought a strong law and
42
economics orientation of a slightly different nature to the bench.
The Chicago School also spread to the enforcement agencies
during the Reagan administration through the appointments of William
Baxter, a renowned law and economics professor at Stanford and later
Douglas Ginsburg, a professor of similar stature at the Harvard Law
School, who attended the University of Chicago Law School and had
taught antitrust and regulated industries at Harvard from an economic
perspective. 43 During their tenure, and continuing to this day, the role
of the economist and economic analysis by the legal staff has increased
dramatically and remains the dominant form of discourse within both
the Antitrust Division, and its sister enforcement agency the Federal
Trade Commission.
While antitrust originally started as a form of federal common law
in the courts, in recent decades the balance of law-making power has
shifted to the federal enforcement agencies. The Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department, often in concert with the Federal Trade
Commission, has strongly centralized the law-making function in
40 E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The
Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1606-16 (2004); Andrew
I. Gavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers:Sylvania and the Process of Change in the Supreme
Court, 17 ANTITRUST 8 (2002) (detailing the Chicago School influence on Justice Powell in key
antitrust decisions of the Supreme Court).
41 Such appointments included Richard Posner, Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Douglas
Ginsburg, and Ralph Winter. VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 7, at 308-11 (discussing judicial
appointments of Judges Posner, Bork, and Easterbrook); Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter,
The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German
Doctrinalism,31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 332 (2008) (discussing Judge Winter's
relationship with the Chicago School); Douglas H. Ginsburg, University of Chicago Law School,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/ginsburg (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
42 STEPHEN
REGULATION

BREYER,
(1993);

BREAKING

STEPHEN

THE

BREYER,

VICIOUS

CIRCLE:

REGULATION

AND

TOWARD
ITS

EFFECTIVE RISK

REFORM

(1982).

The

congruence between the views of Justice Breyer and those of the Chicago School is discussed in
Kovacic, supra note 1l,passim.
43 See Stanford Univ. Senate of the Academic Council, Memorial Resolution for William
Francis Baxter, Jr. (Apr. 27, 2000), http://histsoc.stanford.edu/pdfinem/BaxterW.pdf (last visited
Oct. 15, 2009) (detailing the career of William Baxter); Ginsburg, Douglas-George Mason Law,
http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/bio.phpfac=20 (last visited Oct 15, 2009) (summarizing the
career of Distinguished Adjunct Professor and Judge Douglas Ginsburg). Subsequent to his
executive branch service, Douglas Ginsburg was appointed to the D.C. Circuit where he currently
serves as Chief Judge. Id.
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antitrust through case selection, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
the issuance of influential joint antitrust guidelines covering most areas
of the law, the negotiation of consent decrees with defendants, the
revision or elimination of older consent decrees that no longer reflect
the agencies' vision of current law and/or policy, the issuance of
business review letters and advisory opinions, the filing of amicus briefs
in private antitrust litigation, the holding of hearings, and the issuance
of reports and research. 44 The end result has been a long standing
reliance on an economic approach to antitrust, normally of a Chicago
School variety, most noticeably in the Republican administrations since
1980. 45

These changes have been aided by the fact that antitrust has always
had strong receptors attracted to economic theory. Antitrust as a
discipline has relied on economics heavily throughout most of its
existence and has tended to reflect the dominant economic discourse of
any particular era. Antitrust, in fact, can be thought of as an ongoing
conversation between legal and economic thinking, waxing and waning
with the prevailing economic paradigms. 46 The antitrust agencies are
not just ideologically receptive to economic thinking, but also
institutionally structured to receive such thinking, having incorporated
economists into the Antitrust Division since the 1930s, and well
respected lawyer/economists, such as Donald Turner, as heads of the
47
Division in the 1960s, and a similar history at the FTC.
An equally important part of the centralization of the antitrust field
has been the relative diminution of private antitrust litigation as a source
of antitrust law-making. While private antitrust litigation continues to
dwarf the number of cases brought by the federal enforcement agencies,
private cases are not a source of new antitrust doctrine, and are, if

44 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecutionby Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998).
45 These changes have also diminished the importance of state enforcement of the antitrust

laws. The states have been important enforcers of their own antitrust laws and, as plaintiffs, of
the federal antitrust laws. They often have taken positions at odds with the federal agencies and a
Chicago School approach. Although beyond the scope of this essay, the states' role has also
come under increasing criticism and calls for restriction as antitrust has centralized and adopted a
more Chicago School perspective. See generally Richard Wolfram & Spencer Weber Waller,
Contemporary Antitrust Federalism: Cluster Bombs or Rough Justice?, in ANTITRUST LAW IN

NEW YORK STATE ch. 1 (Robert L. Hubbard & Pamela Jones Harbour eds., 2d ed. 2002).
46 Waller, supra note 28, at 296-3 10.
47 SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN

THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 28-31, 128-29 (1977). One small example is the elevation of the head
economist in the Antitrust Division from the title of Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney
General to Deputy Assistant Attorney General, the only non-legal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Justice Department outside of the purely administrative area. Similarly, in the
FTC, the Director of Bureau of Economics is the highest staff position, co-equal to the Directors
of Consumer Protection and the Bureau of Competition, and normally the only non-lawyer at that

level in the agency.
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anything, an opportunity for the federal courts to further limit the reach
of antitrust. Most private antitrust cases are treble damage cases
seeking overcharges from alleged price fixing. Often these cases follow
(or occur simultaneously) with criminal investigations or prosecutions
by the Justice Department. While vital to recovering damages for direct
purchasers, they are not a vital source of new doctrine creation in the
antitrust field.
Even the most routine private antitrust case now faces a large and
growing number of hurdles. First, the private antitrust plaintiffs bar
faces all the general hurdles that the plaintiff and class action bars face
48
in bringing cases under the heightened pleadings standard of Twombly,
getting expert testimony into evidence 49 and getting class actions
certified under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Class
Action Fairness Act. 50 More specific to antitrust, plaintiffs face
specialized rules of standing, antitrust injury, jurisdiction, direct
purchaser requirements, causation, and proof of damage requirements
that make even the most routine antitrust cause of action a long and
51
risky proposition.
Those cases which stray outside the bounds of the consensus
condemnation of price fixing by competitors unaccompanied by any
proof of efficiencies (i.e., hard-core cartels) face even higher hurdles.
Most lower court cases allowing novel theories or actual recoveries
beyond the price fixing area have attracted the notice of the federal
enforcement agencies and more often than not amicus briefs arguing for
the defendant's position. The Supreme Court recently has shown more
interest in antitrust and since 1993 has uniformly ruled for defendants,
using private litigation as a way to further narrow, rather than expand,
52
antitrust's domain.
In addition to centralization, antitrust is an example of a field that
did not have a sufficiently robust set of competing first principles to
resist the influence of the Chicago School when it entered the field. In
48 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
49 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1711-1715 (2006).
51 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (eliminating
jurisdiction over claims by most foreign victims of antitrust violations); Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (setting
standing rules for private plaintiffs in antitrust cases); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977) (limiting suits for damages from unlawful overcharges to direct purchasers of product or
service in question); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)

(requiring demonstration of antitrust injury).
52 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (holding that state attorneys
general stated claim in suit against foreign insurance companies and related parties); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (reversing summary judgment
for defendant in private suit alleging unlawful tying of parts and services for copier machines).
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the 1950s, antitrust was characterized by numerous rules that held that
different types of agreements and corporate conduct were per se

unlawful. There were few unifying themes to many of these cases. The
prevailing economic model relied on a paradigm that industry structure
largely determined industry behavior and economic performance. 53 As
a matter of law, this paradigm normally did not provide easy rules to
apply in individual cases, and as a matter of economics, was
increasingly subject to empirical challenges. In the end, the old
paradigm proved insufficient as a defense to change.
A strong argument can be made that as a result of this combination
of factors, the dominant strain in antitrust law and enforcement for the
foreseeable future in the United States is that of the Chicago School.
Despite the assertion of numerous post-Chicago and non-Chicago

approaches to antitrust, 54 many commentators argue we are all Chicago
School now and that the Chicago School has absorbed most of the

competing approaches. As early as 1979, then Professor Posner argued
that the so-called Chicago and Harvard schools of antitrust were largely

on the same page in analyzing any particular antitrust issue. 55 While
critiquing the early Harvard school approach as episodic,
impressionistic, and largely non-theoretical, he argued that most

commentators had already accepted the basic Chicago School position
that the proper lens to analyze antitrust was that of price theory and
most, but not all, Chicago School followers had accepted various
refinements and modifications of Director's original teachings. 56 He
then explored the convergence of the two approaches on most doctrinal
issues with the exception of economic concentration. 57 In more recent

years, now Judge Posner and other commentators have forcefully
School
continued to press the theme of convergence and Chicago
58
triumphalism in a wide variety of other writings and speeches.

53 See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959); Edward S. Mason, The
Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the UnitedStates, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1949).
54 See generally POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW (Antonio Cucinotta et
al. eds., 2002) (a collection of works discussing the extent to which competition law has
incorporated Chicagoan views of the economics of competition and whether this incorporation
will continue). For an argument that antitrust law has moved away from Chicagoan views since
the 1990s, see Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW, supra, at 69-71; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After
Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-ChicagoAntitrust: A Review
and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257; Symposium on Post-Chicago Economics, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 445 (1995).
55 Posner, supra note 29.
56 Id. at 932.
57 Id. at 933-34.

58 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at vii-x (2d ed. 2001); Michael S. Jacobs, An
Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219 (1995)
(comparing Chicago School and post-Chicago perspectives); Kovacic, supra note 11, at 13-14;
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
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What is equally interesting is the growing trend for those
associated with the Harvard School and other approaches to view
antitrust law in similar terms. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, the author
of the current edition of the treatise begun by Phillip Areeda and Donald
Turner, two of the key legal figures for the Harvard School, analyzes
the growth of the law in almost identical terms. 59 The policy
prescriptions in the current edition of the treatise and in his other
writings are simply not that different from those advocated by a more
traditional Chicago School perspective, even where Professor
Hovenkamp analyzes matters in a slightly different fashion. 60 A current
FTC Commissioner has referred to the convergence of both schools of
61
thought as the intertwined intellectual DNA of modem antitrust.
62
These trends are unlikely to change dramatically any time soon.
Even a change in the politics or antitrust philosophy in the Executive
Branch does not quickly alter the composition or discourse of the
federal judiciary or the composition of the civil servants at the
enforcement agencies. Legislation to reverse specific Supreme Court
decisions is notoriously hard to accomplish. Agency guidelines can be
modified, but are rarely jettisoned or radically altered en masse. The
private antitrust bar remains subject to the same doctrinal, procedural,
and practical restrictions regardless of which party occupies the White
House. Moreover, the federal agencies would face many of the same
problems even if they turned on a dime and suddenly began bringing
more numerous and different types of antitrust cases than they have in
recent years.
In addition, viruses sometimes destroy their hosts. What is more
important, however, is that a virus propagates and transmits itself to
other hosts before it does so. Whether positive or not, the Chicago
School has transformed antitrust law, making dramatic future changes
unlikely because of the very institutional and ideological changes that
the Chicago School has engendered in the field. Unlike the case of
antitrust in the 1950s through the 1970s, antitrust is now heavily
ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003) (criticizing view of antitrust history as pendular in nature and
emphasizing continuity of recent enforcement regardless of political administration); Timothy J.
Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the American Bar Association Antitrust
Section Fall Forum: How History Informs Practice-Understanding the Development of Modem
U.S.
Competition
Policy
(Nov.
19,
2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
murisfallaba.pdf.
59 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (2d ed. 2000).
60 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 305-12

(2005).
61 Kovacic, supra note 11. But see Einer Elhauge, Harvard,Not Chicago: Which Antitrust
School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?,3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 59 (2007).
62 See Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006
Term andBeyond, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 25 (2007).
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centralized with a robust set of first principles to defend. While
antitrust history is hardly over, it is likely to be more resistant to the
attack of new legal ideologies for some time to come for precisely the
same reasons antitrust was so receptive to the introduction of the
Chicago School in the first place.
The Chicago School virus, like most viruses, has mutated into
more benign and more virulent forms.
So-called post-Chicago
63
64
economics and behavioral economics have each made a claim that
antitrust intervention is warranted in a wider group of areas than current
government policy; and libertarian 65 and Ayn Randian critiques 66 have
suggested that intervention should be further restricted or eliminated
altogether. With rare exceptions, 67 none of these more recent variants
have seriously affected the case law or enforcement programs.
Antitrust was the first body of law to embrace the Law and
Economics approach and remains the best example of how
centralization and the lack of a strong opposing counter-ideology make
a body of law susceptible to a new ideological virus. While antitrust is
even more centralized than it was at the beginning of the Chicago
School attack, it is the stronger ideological core that should protect the
current approach for a considerable time to come.
B.

Consumer ProtectionLaw: Decentralizationas Defense

If one were mapping the physical and intellectual relationships of
fields of law, consumer protection law is probably the closest field to
antitrust law. 68 One would suppose that law and economics would have
migrated early and naturally from its initial successes in the antitrust
63 See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 745, 762-72 (2004); Waller, supra
note 28, at 304-06.
64 See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, A BehaviouralApproach to Antitrust Law and Economics, 14
CONSUMER POL'Y REv. 18 (2004); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality,
Market Discipline,and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REv. 482 (2002).
65 EDWIN ROCKEFELLER, THE ANTITRUST RELIGION (2007); DOMINICK ARMENTANO,

ANTITRUST: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (2d ed. 1999).
66 THE ABOLITION OF ANTITRUST (Gary Hull ed., 2005).

67 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
68 See Neil Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The PracticalReason for Both
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 44 (1998); Neil Averitt &
Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory ofAntitrust and Consumer Protection
Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the "Consumer
Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007); Robert H. Lande, Consumer
Choice as the Ultimate Goal ofAntitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 503 (2001); Spencer Weber Waller,
Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 535 (2001);
Spencer Weber Waller, In Search of Economic Justice: Considering Competition and Consumer
Protection Law, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631 (2005) [hereinafter Waller, In Search of Economic
Justice].
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field to consumer protection law, where it would have enjoyed similar
success. However, this simply is not so. Law and economics analysis
has been applied to any number of consumer protection issues and the
law has often moved in the direction of a more economic approach to
selected issues. But as a field, consumer protection law has no single
organizing principle and has been highly resistant to organizing itself
solely around the insights offered by economically oriented legal
commentators.
Unlike antitrust law, consumer protection is highly decentralized
and only partially federalized. 69 The Federal Trade Commission, the
one key federal player in the field, is in fact the body where law and
economics analysis has enjoyed its greatest success. The FTC enforces
both competition and consumer protection law through section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair methods of
70
competition and unfair and deceptive acts and practices.
The FTC also has explicit additional statutory authority to proceed
in a wide variety of areas affecting consumers. The FTC can,
depending on its enforcement priorities, budget, and manpower, police
outright fraud in all forms including the internet, false and misleading
advertising, consumer credit, advance deposit loan schemes, consumer
warranties, deceptive labeling practices, mail order purchases, negative
option sales, the do-not-call rules for telephone solicitations, spain email
practices, door-to-door sales practices, as well as a potpourri of statutes
assigned to it by Congress, ranging from the Hobby Protection Act to
the Child Online Privacy Act.7 1 In addition to investigating and
bringing cases, the FTC can issue trade regulation rules covering broad
categories of conduct in particular industries as well as carry out broad,
sweeping investigations and issue reports on practices within its
72
jurisdiction.
Even the breathtaking expanse of the FTC's jurisdiction is merely
a part of the federal government's role in the consumer protection area.
Virtually every cabinet level agency and numerous sectoral regulators
have a significant consumer protection role, including the Food & Drug
69 See David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 45, 46
(2007) (characterizing consumer protection as sprawling and reactive).
70 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). See generally STEPHANIE KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(2003 & Supp. 2009) (discussing the FTC's enforcement powers under section 5 of the Act).
71 The full range of the FTC's statutory authority is summarized in ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 30-52 (2007); DEE PRIDGEN &
RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW (2007); DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD
M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW (2007) [hereinafter PRIDGEN &
ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION]; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FTC IN 2007: A
CHAMPION
FOR
CONSUMERS
AND
COMPETITION
(2007),
available
at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/04/ChairmansReport2OO7.pdf
(last
(summarizing FTC enforcement actions of past fiscal year).
72 See 2 KANWIT, supra note 70, chs. 19, 27.
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Administration, the Consumer Products Safety Commission, the
National Highway Transportation Safety Board, the various federal
bank and savings & loan regulators, the Federal Communications
73
Commission, the Department of Transportation, and so on.
Consumer protection at the state and local level is even more
bewildering. 74 While most states do not have a direct analogue of the
Federal Trade Commission, the Attorneys General of all fifty states
have one or more attorneys specializing in consumer protection matters.
In the larger states, there may be dozens of attorneys organized into a
Consumer Protection Bureau. In the smaller states, there may be as
little as one attorney splitting her time between consumer protection and
other duties, often antitrust matters. 75 These offices bring both criminal
and civil actions to combat various forms of fraud.
Every state also has some form of a public service commission
which regulates energy and communications with a healthy consumer
protection component as part of its statutory responsibilities. Most
states also have one or more executive branch or independent agencies
with regulatory authority over specific sectors such as insurance,
banking, transportation, or professional services that have additional
responsibilities in the consumer protection area. Larger counties and
municipalities may have their own local prosecutors with criminal and
civil jurisdiction over fraudulent conduct, and often times a city level
Department of Consumer Services with substantial regulatory authority
over local transportation, weights and measures, and other deceptive
76
retail practices that harm consumers.
The final piece of the puzzle is the presence of differing private
rights of actions at the federal and state levels. Although the FTC Act
itself has no private right of action, many of the other statutes enforced
by the FTC have explicit private rights of actions including statutory
minimum damages plus attorneys' fees and costs for prevailing
plaintiffs. 77 Furthermore, class actions are available if plaintiffs meet
the requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
state law equivalents. 78 Even common law fraud can be the basis of a
73 Spencer Weber Waller & Jillian G. Brady, Consumer Protection in the United States: An
Overview, in STRENGTHENING THE CONSUMER PROTECTION REGIME (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1000226. For the full array of the federal government's consumer
functions, see http://consumer.gov/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
74 Friedman, supra note 69, at 51-52 (highlighting problem of overlapping jurisdiction
making it difficult for consumers to know where to direct complaints).
75 Waller, In Search ofEconomic Justice, supra note 68, at 635.
76 See,

e.g.,

City

of

Chicago-Department

of

Consumer

Services,

http://www.cityofchicago.org/ConsumerServices (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
77 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2006) (specifyring which provisions of the Truth in Lending
Act are subject to statutory damages in private litigation).
78 FED. R. CIv. P. 23. But see Edward F. Sherman, Decline and Fall,93 A.B.A. J. 51 (2007)
(surveying procedural and substantive changes in law affecting consumer class actions).
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federal lawsuit if the statutory requirements of diversity jurisdiction 79
Act permits the case to be
can be met, or if the Class Action 8Fairness
0
brought or removed to federal court.
Under state law, the array of potential private consumer protection
cases is even broader. Many state statutes incorporate the standards of
the FTC Act into their own state law and allow suits for actual and
punitive damages. 81 State law would also allow concurrent jurisdiction
for most violations of federal law, explicit and implied private rights of
action for state statutory violations, and common law theories of
recovery, including old-fashioned fraud.
Even this survey of the field suggests that consumer protection law
is barely a field, in the sense of a single unified body of law and
procedure. It is more probably a number of different fields loosely
stitched together under the rubric of consumer law, more for ease of
teaching and enforcement, rather than because of any unifying principle.
As a leading commentator has noted, "[m]odern consumer protection
law is actually a legal reform effort addressing certain inequities
''82
perceived in traditional legal doctrine.
While this spirit of reform can be viewed as a mild form of
ideology, it is the extensive decentralization of the field that best
protects it from capture by more coherent ideologies. There is simply
no effective set of receptors for the Law and Economics ideology, or
any other ideology, to take hold and colonize the field. Without the
existence or the prospect of a single host, capturing consumer protection
law would require the capture of the entire federal, state, and common
law legal systems even in the absence of a strong competing ideology.
Unsurprisingly, there is little likelihood of dramatic change.
C.

Child and FamilyLaw: Decentralizationand Competing Ideology
Combine to Fight Off Infection

One prototypical example of a field where law and economics has
gained little traction is child and family law. In the abstract, there is no
reason why this should be so since a wide variety of non-market
behavior, including family law issues, can be analyzed in economic
terms. 83 Indeed, Gary Becker of the University of Chicago won the
79 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
80 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (2006).
81 See, e.g., Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 505/2, 505110a (2008) (providing for a private right of action for damages for violation of
the Act, which includes acts in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act).
82 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 71, at 2.
83 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 145-66 (6th ed. 2003); RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
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84
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1992 for just such work.
However, the real world impact of such academic work has had
little of the effect that law and economics has had in other regulatory,
statutory, or even common law areas. Much of the teachings of law and
economics have been affirmatively rejected, and even ridiculed, in a
way that is simply different from other areas of the law. For example,
Richard Posner received virulent, and often unfair, criticism in response
to scholarship that recommended the introduction of greater market
forces into the adoption process. 85 Critics more often than not
responded with charges of "baby selling," rather than a serious
86
examination of the ideas proposed by then Professor Posner.
One potential explanation for the relatively tepid reception for law
and economics in the child and family law area is that this field of law
deals with non-market behavior rather than the classic market
paradigms for antitrust, corporate, and commercial law, where law and
economics has enjoyed its greatest successes. 87 A more sophisticated
explanation lies in the two-step model in which the traditional nonmarket nature of child and family law is merely one aspect of the
immune response of the family law host to the introduction of law and
economics principles.
First, there is no body of American law that is more decentralized
than family law, making it virtually impossible for any new ideology to
capture the field. There is no federal department or agency for family
affairs. Obviously, the Departments of Education, Housing and Urban
Affairs, and Health and Human Services make policies that have
profound effects on families, but they do so primarily through the

84 Gary S. Becker Winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics, http://almaz.com/nobel/
economics/1992a.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE
ON THE FAMILY (1981); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR

(1976). As Professor Becker's biography in Encyclopedia Britannica notes, Becker analyzed the
household as a sort of factory, producing goods and services such as meals, shelter, and child
care. Applying theories of production to household behavior, he was able to make predictions
about family size, divorce, and the role of women in the workplace. Encyclopedia Britannica
Online Entry for Gary S. Becker, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9014037/Gary-S-Becker
(last visited Oct. 15, 2009); see also VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 7, at 109-53 (analyzing
Becker's broader body of work and impact upon academic economists).
85 Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67
B.U. L. REV. 59, 72 (1987).
86 On October 24, 2009, a Google search of the internet produced over 850 hits for "Posner"
and "baby selling."
87 In addition, commentators have noted the modern rejection of the legal treatment of
women and children as property. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood:A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313 (1998);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "ho Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992). This is another factor that leads to the relative
lack of appeal of the law and economic methodology to the extent that such an approach would
recommodify aspects of family relations.
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administration of benefit programs, rather than the direct setting of legal
policy. While these benefit programs come with many restrictions and
conditions, they do not seem to have been used systematically to require
the adoption of a Chicago School perspective at the state or local
level. 88 If anything, offshoots of the existing non-economic approach
have been incorporated into many of these federal programs, reinforcing
89
the existing ideological structure.

Moreover, the federal courts have little jurisdiction over issues of
family law and there is a strong tradition of federalism that delegates
family law issues to the states. Even when the formal requirements for

federal jurisdiction are present, the federal courts have developed
prudential doctrines of abstention that limit access to the federal courts

for family law matters under most circumstances. 90
88 In several instances, conditions on federal funding have been an important centralizing
factor for the introduction of economic incentives which have arguably injected more of a costbenefit analysis consistent with a Chicago School approach into the decision making process for
adoptions and reunifications of families. For example, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), requires states to adopt certain plans to more quickly reunite children with their families
or place them for adoption. States that do so receive financial incentives for children permanently
placed within the meaning of the Act. For example, states receive $4000 in federal funds per
fiscal year for each foster child adoption which exceeds a certain base and an additional $4000 for
special needs adoptions. 42 U.S.C.A. § 673b(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
Every state has promulgated new legislation in response to the Act to maintain their eligibility for
federal funding. See Steve Christian, State Child Welfare Legislation: 2001, ST. LEGIS. REP.
(Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2002, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/stleg.htm; Carmela Welte, Detailed Summary of the Adoption
and Safe FamiliesAct, http://www.casanet.org/reference/asfa-sumnary.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2009).
However, this type of financial incentive to better achieve permanency planning can be
characterized as consistent with the prevailing best interests of the child ideology of the field.
Such financial incentives for underfunded agencies and services are an important fact of life, but
the effects of these incentives on any individual case normally are contested when perceived as in
conflict with the best interest of the child, thus limiting the paradigm altering effect of such
incentives in this area of the law. See generally Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence:A
CriticalAnalysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1(2001);
Paul Anthony Wilhelm, Permanency at What Cost? Five Years of Imprudence Under the
Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 617 (2002).
89 Many of these benefits programs have promoted the adoption of what is known as
permanency planning in the child welfare area, which is consistent with the best interests of the
child paradigm that is one of the principal ideological bulwarks in child and family law. See
RICHARD P. BARTH ET AL., FROM CHILD ABUSE TO PERMANENCY PLANNING: CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES PATHWAYS AND PLACEMENTS (1994); ANTHONY N. MALUCCIO ET AL., PERMANENCY

PLANNING FOR CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND METHODS (1986); THE CHILD'S JOURNEY THROUGH
CARE: PLACEMENT STABILITY, CARE PLANNING,

AND ACHIEVING PERMANENCY

(Dorota

Iwaniec ed., 2006).
90 RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1278-83 (5th ed. 2003); Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal
Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131 (2009). The limits and exceptions to the related socalled probate exception to federal jurisdiction were most recently discussed by the Supreme
Court in the estate claims brought by Anna Nicole Smith. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293
(2006).
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At the state level, it is not clear how one would capture the field,
even if one were so inclined. Few states have a cabinet level
department for family matters.
Rather, family law regulation is
ubiquitous, but highly diffuse. There are literally hundreds of local and
county level offices for welfare, guardianship, and child and family
services.
The private litigation picture in state courts is virtually the opposite
of the federal courts. Family law issues are heard in virtually every
specialized and general state court in all fifty states, with a large and
vigorous bar of private practitioners and child welfare advocates
enforcing and defending the majority of claims.
Outside of a handful of international treaties dealing with
specialized custody and adoption issues, there is no uniform lawmaking body that would impose order on this sprawling body of law.
Like in consumer law, one would literally have to commandeer the
entire common law, private, and public law-making apparatus of the
United States in order to persuade or impose the adoption of law and
economics or any other legal ideology.
If the utter decentralization of child and family law makes it
difficult to capture by any outside force or ideology, the presence of a
strong coherent ideology of its own over the past thirty years makes it
strongly resistant to those strands of new ideology that somehow
penetrate the system. The best interest of the child is just such an
ideology. 9 1 This principle further has been codified in the statutes and
regulations of most state and local laws and affirmed numerous times in
common law court decisions. 92 The fact that such a core enduring
principle has little to do with the market focus and the efficiency goals
of the law and economics movement has only reinforced the immune
response of this area of the law when law and economics principles and
other non-traditional views have sought to influence this area of law and
policy.
To the extent that child and family law has been predisposed to
adopt an interdisciplinary approach, it has historically turned to
psychology and social work, and not economics, for its inspiration. For
example, the field of social work dates back to the work of Jane
Addams and the growth of settlement houses in Chicago to address the
needs of the poor and immigrant communities unmet by public

91 See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
92 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DETERMINING

THE

BEST

INTERESTS

OF

THE

CHILD:

SUMMARY

OF

STATE

LAWS,

http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/Iaws-policies/statutes/best -interestall.pdf (last visited
Oct. 15, 2009) (summarizing state laws using best interests of the child as basis for determination
of placement and custody).

HeinOnline -- 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 393 2009-2010

394

CARDOZO LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 31:2

institutions. 93 According to the Code of the Ethics of the National
Association of Social Workers:
The mission of the social work profession is rooted in a set of core
values. These core values, embraced by social workers throughout
the profession's history, are the foundation of social work's unique
purpose and perspective:
" service
" social justice
* dignity and worth of the person
" importance of human relationships
" integrity
94
* competence.
The point is not whether social workers or the family law
communiy are more or less virtuous than anyone else; or whether the
field would benefit from the market oriented efficiency goals associated
with law and economics analysis. Rather, the above characterization of
family law-as a decentralized field with a deep, long-established
commitment to a competing ideology and discourse-demonstrate why
family law is a highly unlikely host for the law and economics virus.
D.

European Competition Law: Infection and Resistance

What is equally fascinating is how the Chicago School's success is
significant, but far more limited, when transmitted from the United
States antitrust context to that of European competition law. 95 One
might have assumed that the virus would have jumped the pond given
the highly similar nature of the field and the similar backgrounds,

93 JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL-HOuSE (1910); JAMES LINN, JANE ADDAMS: A

BIOGRAPHY (2000).
94 Code
of
Ethics
of
the
National
Association
of
Social
Workers,
http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
95 Although beyond the scope of this paper, there is a growing debate about the extent of the
influence of the law and economics movement on European law generally. See Kristoffel
Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The TransatlanticDivergence in Legal Thought: American Law and
Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008) (arguing
that law and economics is more prominent in U.S. legal academia because of the different
philosophical roots and attitudes towards utilitarianism and consequentionalist thinking in both
systems); Thomas S. Ulen & Nuno Garoupa, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and
Economics in Europe and the United States (Univ. of I11.Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
LE07-009, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfinabstractid=972360
(arguing that lack of competition in European higher education accounts for relatively weak
reception of law and economics in European law); Kilian Reber, Once Upon a Time in America:
Barriers to the Diffusion of Law & Economics (July 16, 2008) (modified unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Basel, Switzerland), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfmn?abstractid= 1161129.
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connections, and networks between people working in the field. 96 Here
again, the twin hypotheses of centralization and competing first
principles help explain the tensions within the current discourse of
European competition law and why it is too soon to tell the final
outcome of the struggle.
What we call antitrust law, Europe calls competition law.
Competition law has been enshrined in the EEC Treaty of 1957 and all
subsequent amendments. The current Article 81 of the E.U. treaty
prohibits "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market." Then it lists a series of non-exclusive examples of
such unlawful agreements. 97 Article 81(2) holds that any such illegal
agreement is void and Article 81(3) lists a series of conditions under
which illegal agreements can be granted an exemption. Article 82 bars
the abuse of a dominant position and includes a list of illustrative
examples similar to that contained in Article 81.98 Finally, in a marked
departure from U.S. antitrust law, Article 86 applies these competition
provisions to "public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights." 99
96 Spencer Weber Waller, The InternationalizationofAntitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV.
343 (1997). See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36-64 (2004)
(discussing trend toward transnational networks of government regulators, including in the
competition field).
97 The examples of prohibited agreements are those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
98 Such abuse may, in particular, consist of:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. art. 82.
99 For a comparison of U.S. and E.U. policy on this point, see Spencer Weber Waller,
Bringing Globalism Home: Lessonsfrom Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 118-24
(2000); Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market, I IND. J. GLOBAL
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Enforcement of the competition provisions did not begin until 1962
with the passage of Regulation 17, which established the European
Commission for all practical purposes as the sole enforcer of E.U.
competition law. 10 0 Regulation 17 granted the European Commission
the exclusive power to investigate potential violations, impose penalties
for non-compliance with an investigation, grant exemptions pursuant to
Article 81(3), and impose fines up to 10% of the world-wide annual
turnover for enterprises found to have violated the E.U. competition
provisions. A key provision barred the imposition of fines for
agreements that were notified to the Commission in connection with a
request for an exemption until the Commission had reviewed and
denied the requested exemption. Later regulations required firms to
notify the Commission of "concentrations" of a "Community
dimension" and empowered the Commission to investigate and prohibit
any such notified transactions if incompatible with the Community.' 0'
The Commission quickly found itself drowning in the review of
routine commercial agreements that had little potential to injure
competition. The Commission's early response to this deluge of
notifications was to issue "group exemptions" and other notices that
contained a list of conditions, which if satisfied, would automatically
confer exemption under Article 81(3) and not require any advance
notification to the Commission. 102 Thus, until recently, the European
Commission was the center of the E.U. competition law universe.
Although highly centralized, E.U. competition law had strong
ideological reasons why it initially was highly unreceptive to Chicago
School ideology. Whatever was borrowed from the United States came
before the influence of the Chicago School.
In addition, E.U.
competition law historically was strongly rooted in ordo-liberalism, a
body of thought associated with the German Freiburg School that
sought to create a proper legal environment for the economy and
maintain a healthy level of competition through democratic measures
LEGAL STUD. 409 (1994).

100 Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 J.O (13) 204 (as amended).
101 Council Regulation 139/2004, On the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 (EC) (as amended, replacing Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395)
1), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:
0022:EN:PDF.
102 See, e.g., Commission Regulation 772/2004, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_123/1_12320040427en00 110017.pdf;
Commission Regulation 4087/88, On the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories
of Franchise Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46 (repealed); Commission Notice on Agreements of
Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 8 1(1) of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2001 O.J. (C 368) 13, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:368:0013:0015:
EN:PDF; see also 2 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD

§ 16.3 (3d ed. 1997); RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 168-69 (5th ed. 2003).
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that adhere to market principles, but which limited the economic,
10 3
political, and social power of individuals or groups of private actors.
E.U. competition law also came equipped with a second set of
founding principles that acted as a deterrent to rapid ideological change.
For at least its first forty years E.U. competition law was ruled by the
"integration imperative," a different but equally strong deontological
first principle. The integration imperative viewed competition law as a
vital part of achieving the overall vision of an integrated European
Common Market (later a European Union) with freedom of movement
for goods, services, people, and money. 10 4 Thus, where references to
competition policy appear throughout the E.U. Treaty, they normally do
so in the context of helping to achieve and complete the overall goals of
05
the European Union. 1
Both of these original motivations for E.U. competition law faded
and faced challenges as direct study and personal, professional, and
academic contacts between the U.S. and E.U. competition communities
introduced E.U. competition jurisprudence to the Chicago School. This
meant that decisions by U.S. courts and agencies-as well as increasing
contacts between the U.S. and E.U. enforcement agencies in light of the
globalization of antitrust enforcement-would inevitably expose E.U.
10 6
decision-makers to Chicago School jurisprudence.
The growing success of the completion and expansion of the
internal market within the E.U. also meant that the integration
imperative had been largely achieved, for at least the earliest group of
member states, allowing for a more tolerant attitude toward certain
10 7
vertical restraints that began to appear in E.U. enforcement policy.
Specific developments within E.U. competition jurisprudence have
accelerated the introduction of law and economics reasoning in certain
areas of the field but not others. The E.U. suffered a series of
embarrassing defeats in merger cases before the Court of First Instance
103 See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:

PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998); Nicola Giocoli, Competition vs. Property Rights: American
Antitrust Law, the Freiburg School and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=987788.
104 GERBER, supra note 103, at 4, 7; WALLER, supra note 102, § 16.1, at 16-2 ("EU
competition law must be understood in the context of the need to break down the national
boundaries between Member States of the EU and to complete the unification of the common
market.").
105 See, e.g., EC Treaty, supranote 97, arts. 2, 3, 5.
106 See generally Waller, supra note 96. While beyond the scope of this paper, the past thirty
years have also featured an increasing degree of contacts between E.U. officials and U.S.
educational and non-profit institutions featuring Chicago School perspectives through graduate
schools, conferences, personnel exchanges, and international organizations like the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Competition Network (ICN).
107 GERBER, supra note 103, at 384, 389.
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(CFI), the judicial body which initially reviews Commission
competition decisions. In these cases, the CFI reversed Commission
decisions prohibiting certain mergers on the grounds that the
Commission had failed to show harm to competition in economic

terms. 108
In response, the Commission issued merger guidelines that track
quite closely the type of agency enforcement guidelines that have been
in place in the United States since 1982.109

The Commission also

announced that it was hiring for the first time a Chief Economist and
creating an economics unit similar to what had been in place in the
United States for decades. 110 Moreover, when the Commission decided
high profile merger cases such as Boeing/McDonnell and
GE/Honeywell differently than its U.S. counterparts, it was subject to
fierce U.S. criticism that at times degenerated into name calling and
insults.' 1 1

The change in tone and focus was further illustrated in a long term
project to review E.U. competition provisions relating to abuses of a
dominant position to reformulate enforcement policy in more economic
108 Case C-12/03 P, Comm'n v. Tetra Laval BV, 2005 E.C.R. 1-987, aJfg Case T-5/02, 2002
E.C.R. 11-4381; Case T-77/02, Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4201; Case T310/01, Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071; Case T-342/99, Airtours PLC v.
Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585. In 2007, the Court held that the Commission may be liable to the
private parties in Schneider Electric for the unlawful prohibition of the merger. Case T-351/03,
Schneider Elec. SA v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-2237. Recently, that ruling was somewhat
tempered on appeal. See Case C-440/07 P, Comm'n v. Schneider Elec. SA (July 16, 2009),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (enter "C-440/07" into the case
number field and then follow the second "C-440/07 P" link from the top).
109 Compare Commission Regulation 802/2004, Implementing Council Regulation 139/2004
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:133:0001:0039:EN:PDF,

with U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (rev.

ed. 1997), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
110 See Chief Competition Economist for the European Commission's Directorate General for
Competition, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/role-en.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2009).
111 Eleanor M. Fox, The European Court's Judgment in GE/Honeywell-Not a Poster Child
for Comity or Convergence, 20 ANTITRUST 77 (2006); William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate
Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV.
533 (2002); William Kolasky, GE/Honeywell: Narrowing but Not Closing the Gap, 20

ANTITRUST 69 (2006); William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Comparative Merger Control Analysis: Six Guiding Principles for Antitrust
Agencies-New and Old, Remarks at the International Bar Association Conference on
Competition Law and Policy in a Global Context (Mar. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10845.pdf.
This criticism has continued in the wake of the European Union's Microsoft decision,
which affirmed liability on grounds different and beyond that dealt with in the United States'
consent decree with the company. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, Thomas 0. Barnett, Issues Statement on European Microsoft Decision
(Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2007/226070.pdf.
Such criticism in turn has produced equally strong defense of the decision and resistance by E.U.
officials.
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terms. However, this project has produced quite mixed results. 112
Many of these changes also played out in the ongoing
modernization effort. After years of study, the European Council
finally adopted Council Regulation 1/2003, which took effect on May,
1, 2004' 13 along with a broader package of supporting reforms called
' 14
the "Modernization Package." "
Modernization is a mixed bag when it comes to the adoption of the
Chicago School agenda.
Several important developments in the
modernization package suggest that the influence of the Chicago School
virus is still contested, rather than dominant, in E.U. competition law.
The Article 82 modernization process is apparently bogged down
precisely over the question of how thoroughly the European Union
115
should adopt the Chicago School policy prescriptions in this area.
The Microsoft decision by the Court of First Instance is further evidence
that the European Union is not prepared to accept the Chicago School as
16
either the sole or principal tool for antitrust decision making."
Moreover, the modernization package creates the right of member states
to adopt even stricter measures to control the abuse of a dominant
112 The Commission Guidance on the Enforcement of Article 82, the Staff Discussion Paper,
and other information regarding the E.U.'s Article 82 project is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html.
113 Council Regulation 1/2003, On the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid
Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L1) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 1/2003],
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:001:
0001:0025:EN:PDF.
114 The "Modernization Package" consists of the implementing regulation found in
Commission Regulation 773/2004, Relating to the Conduct of Proceedings by the Commission
Pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/1j23/112320040427en001 80024.pdf,
and
six
accompanying notices: Commission Notice on Cooperation Within the Network of Competition
Authorities, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 43, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0043:0053:EN:PDF;
Commission Notice on the CoOperation Between the Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States in the Application
of Articles 81 and 82 EC, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 54, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0054:0064:EN:PDF;
Commission
Notice on the Handling of Complaints by the Commission Under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C
101)
65, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri OJ:C:2004:101:0065:0077:EN:PDF; Commission Notice on Informal
Guidance Relating to Novel Questions Concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty That
Arise in Individual Cases (Guidance Letters), 2004 O.J. (C 101) 78, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0078:0080:EN:PDF;
Commission
Notice, Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,
2004
O.J.
(C
101)
81,
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.douri=OJ:C:2004:101:0081:0096:EN:PDF; Commission Notice, Guidelines on the
Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0097:0118:EN:PDF.
115 Wolfgang Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 EC in the Light of the "Economic
Approach," in ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION: NEW INTERPRETATION, NEW ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS? 1 (Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt et al. eds., 2008) (analyzing internal inconsistency in
E.U. discussion paper on Article 82 reform).
116 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601.
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position if they so choose, 1 7 which creates the type of decentralization
that prevents easy ideological spread or capture.
As part of modernization, the E.U. has embarked on a general and
quite radical decentralization of competition law and enforcement. The
modernization package and later initiatives contained a number of
important changes that devolve enforcement powers to national
competition authorities, national courts, and private litigants. First, the
Commission discontinued the practice of issuing comfort letters, a
practice akin to both formal and informal advisory opinions about
whether agreements are subject to E.U. competition law. 1 18 Second, the
Modernization effort eliminated the Commission's monopoly on the
issuance and interpretation of individual exemptions set forth in Article
81(3) of the E.U. Treaty. 119 Following modernization, national
competition authorities and the national courts have the task of both
interpreting whether a practice violated Article 81 and also whether it is
protected by an individual or group exemption.120 As a result, national
competition authorities will enforce both E.U. and national competition
law for the first time. Finally, the Commission issued a green paper on
the promotion of private rights of action for damages for overcharges by
cartels with the announced hope of increased private enforcement in
national courts. 121
The Commission hoped to accomplish several things in this
extraordinary devolution of its enforcement powers. First, it hoped to
avoid the need for most notifications and advance reviews outside the
merger area, and focus its enforcement efforts on cartels, market
segmentation, selected cases of the abuse of a dominant position, and
significant mergers and acquisitions. Second, it hoped that national
competition authorities would take up much of the slack and increase
117 Philip Lowe, Dir. Gen. of the European Comm'n's Directorate Gen. for Competition, The
Role of the Commission in the Modernisation of EC Competition Law, Speech at the UKAEL
Conference on Modernisation of EC Competition Law: Uncertainties and Opportunities (Jan. 23,
2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2004_007-en.pdf
("For
unilateral conduct the degree of harmonisation is less far reaching. However even for unilateral
conduct it should be noted that there is some degree of harmonisation. The Regulation introduces
a kind of minimum standard. In other words whilst Member States are free to apply stricter rules,
the level of protection against anticompetitive unilateral conduct cannot go below the standard set
by Article 82 of the Treaty.").
118 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 113.
119 EC Treaty, supra note 97, art. 81(3). Under the old practice, enforcement of E.U.
competition law in member state courts and most private rights of actions were impractical
because defendants would routinely raise issues of exemption that could only be resolved by
often long delayed action by the Commission in Brussels.
120 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 113, art. 1.
121 Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the ECAntitrust Rules, COM
(2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/
com/2005/com2005_0672en01.pdf, see also Commission Staff Working Paper: Annex to the
Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, SEC (2005) 1732 (Dec.
19, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/sp-en.pdf.
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enforcement of both national and E.U. competition principles acting
alone and in concert with each other and the Commission through a new
European Competition Network. 122 Finally, it hoped that private
enforcement would become a meaningful part of competition law in
23
national courts.'
The battle for the heart and soul of E.U. competition law thus
continues without a clear winner. The Chicago School has shaped
many recent initiatives, but has virtually no chance of creating
amendments to the Treaty itself, which defines the legal structure for
competition law at the E.U. level. While merger law and vertical
restraints law has moved in the direction of the United States and its
Chicago School influence, the law of unilateral conduct seems to be
rejecting these influences in favor of the E.U.'s ordo-liberal roots.
One recent example is the split between the U.S. and E.U.
approaches to the legality of Microsoft's conduct as the world's
dominant supplier of computer operating systems. While the Antitrust
Division agreed to a consent decree with Microsoft whose provisions
expire shortly, the European Commission has litigated and prevailed,
obtaining a judgment with both injunctive provisions and a substantial
fine, all of which was recently upheld on appeal by the European Court
24
of First Instance.1
Additionally, the E.U. has become increasingly decentralized
through increased member-state and private enforcement. This suggests
that any new ideology will have a difficult time conquering the growing
number of hosts that comprise competition law and policy in the
European Union.

CONCLUSION

This Article has analyzed the relative successes and failures of the
Chicago School's version of the Law and Economics movement in
different bodies of law in viral terms. The viral metaphor creates a
model that describes and predicts the spread or rejection of a legal
ideology between legal jurisdictions and between bodies of law within
the same jurisdiction.
The examples of antitrust in the United States and the European
Union, consumer protection, and child and family law suggest that two
factors principally determine whether a legal virus will successfully
122 See generally Kris Dekeyser & Maria Jaspers, A New Era ofECN Cooperation,30 WORLD
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REv. 3 (2007).
123 See Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules-Modernization of the EU
Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 LOy. CONSUMER L. REV. 431 (2004).
124 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601.
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spread from host to host. First, the greater the degree of centralization,
the greater the likelihood of the virus taking hold, multiplying, and
expressing itself to new adjacent hosts. Second, the higher degree of a
previous strong coherent counter ideology in any particular body of law,
the greater the likelihood that the host will resist the new virus.
Conversely, the greater the lack of a strong preexisting counter ideology
(or antibody in viral terms), the greater the likelihood that the new
ideology will take hold.
There is nothing about this approach that should be limited to the
Chicago School specifically, Law and Economics more generally, or
even the specific fields of law used as illustrations. Like any scientific
hypothesis, the results and predictions of this approach should be tested
and replicated in connection with other ideologies and fields of law. In
particular, closely related areas of law, such as securities regulation and
corporate law, contracts and commercial law, or environmental law and
land use should be examined to see if centralization and the presence of
a competing counter ideology help explain which fields have more
broadly embraced the Chicago School and which have not. Similarly,
more studies of comparative law can reveal the paths through which
legal ideologies spread globally and where they meet resistance.
A viral approach to the spread of legal ideology also has some
interesting and counterintuitive suggestions for either the proponents or
opponents of the Chicago School or any other school of legal thought.
For example, the Chicago School has long asserted that the common
law is superior to either legislation or regulatory solutions, because the
common law more closely tends to develop efficient rules that
maximize wealth as opposed to other sources of rules that are more
prone to capture and rent seeking behavior. 25 Whether or not this
characterization is true, seeking to promote an emerging legal ideology
using common law is probably a counter-productive strategy, because
common law lacks a uniform law-making process or a similar
centralizing agent. Promoting a legal ideology through common law
also runs counter to the historical experience of the Chicago School
itself, marked by early victories in antitrust and other areas of economic
regulation. There, a well developed, highly centralized bureaucracy was
the perfect host for the introduction of Chicago School methodology.
Such methodology has spread more quickly and more thoroughly in
similarly centralized fields of economic regulation as opposed to the
more highly diffused common law world of state and federal private
125 John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEG. STUD.
393 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487 (1980); George L. Priest, The Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEG. STuD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is
the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 51 (1977).
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litigation.
From a matter of strategy, the proponents of a new ideology
similarly should seek out those hosts in ideological disarray or those
with an ideological vacuum to fill, rather than those jurisdictions or
bodies of law with a robust competing ideology that functions as an
immune system to fight off the new introductions of new ways of
thinking. Conversely, the defenders of the status quo should boost their
host's immune system, lest new ways of thought overwhelm the
existing defenses.
Finally, one cannot forget that viruses are one of the leading
sources of genetic variation, mutation, and evolution. Thus, ideologies
and other legal viruses will rarely stand still. They will develop all
manner of variations and eventually altogether new forms which attack
the old status quo. Thus, the hunter becomes the hunted and an
ideology that previously colonized neighboring hosts finds itself under
attack from new ways of thinking that evolved from what was once
itself the new thinking in a particular field.
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